Author(s): Donato Masciandaro and Francesco Passarelli
Date published: May 2018
SUERF Policy Note, Issue No 33
By Donato Masciandaro and Francesco Passarelli
Jel-codes: D72, D78, E31, E52, E58, E62.
Keywords: Populism, central bank independence, financial inequality, monetary policy, banking policy, political economy
The populist narrative hinges on the feeling of frustration with the current situation. This SUERF Policy Note focuses on financial inequality, populism and central bank independence, shedding light on the relationships between aggrievement in the electorate and large financial inequality, the advancement of populist parties and the risk that myopic policies are going to be adopted. In such a situation a populist policy that promotes a politically controlled central bank – that is perceived as a technocratic elite - it is more likely to occur.
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