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Populism and Central Bank Independence

Author(s): Donato Masciandaro and Francesco Passarelli

Date published: May 2018

SUERF Policy Note, Issue No 33
By Donato Masciandaro and Francesco Passarelli

Jel-codes: D72, D78, E31, E52, E58, E62.
Keywords: Populism, central bank independence, financial inequality, monetary policy, banking policy, political economy

The populist narrative hinges on the feeling of frustration with the current situation. This SUERF Policy Note focuses on financial inequality, populism and central bank independence, shedding light on the relationships between aggrievement in the electorate and large financial inequality, the advancement of populist parties and the risk that myopic policies are going to be adopted. In such a situation a populist policy that promotes a politically controlled central bank – that is perceived as a technocratic elite - it is more likely to occur.

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SUERF Policy Note, Issue No 33SUERF Policy Note, Issue No 33

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