



EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK

EUROSYSTEM

# **“Government bonds: Unsafe assets?” Introductory presentation**

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# Introduction

- **Government bond market is core component of financial system: Safe asset, and price discovery for risk-free rates – recently also bank funding (repo) and active hedge fund trading**
- **Inherently fragile because bond trading is often bilateral, outside exchanges**
- **Dealer-run market => market functioning depends on Dealer capacity**
- **This presentation:**
  - **Background on government bond market liquidity and functioning**
  - **Main themes for today**

# 1 Bond market functioning in US/EU: Theory vs **practice** (1)

## 1. Safe asset = very low credit risk (“information-insensitive”)

- **Dash for cash: Risk-off mode = bond price down**
- **Falling convenience yield and rising CDS spreads as indicators of changed pricing of government bonds?**
- **No longer providing “risk-free rate”?**

## 2. Robust market liquidity driven by resilient intermediation

- **Market liquidity is very sensitive to volatility & depends on Dealer conditions**
- **GFC regulatory reforms, e.g. US SLR have reduced bank Dealer capacity**
- **Non-bank dealers expand rapidly, but only limited warehousing capacity**
- **Multiple stress episodes requiring central banks to step in**

# 1 Bond market functioning in US/EU: Theory vs **practice** (2)

## 3. Efficient and resilient market infrastructure

- **Fragmented trading across many platforms (including voice) and high share of bilaterally cleared trades (cash / repos)**
- **Slow progress in effective publication of trade details (TRACE & Consol. Tape)**
- **Similar asset = similar price: Integration of cash, repo, futures & CDS**
- **Significant settlement, liquidity and operational risks**

## 4. Diversified and stable investor base

- **High share of “Fast money”: Increasing use of government bond as speculative instrument (Bond vs futures arbitrage ~ US\$ 1 TRN)**


## 5. Smooth sovereign funding driven by sound fiscal policy

- **Huge growth in US/EU sovereign borrowing overwhelming market capacity?**

## 2 *Main themes for today*

- I. Properties of safe assets
- II. Market liquidity and role of Dealers
- III. Optimal infrastructure for trading and clearing of bonds & repos
- IV. Transparency
- V. Central Bank policy
- VI. Fiscal policy (“elephant in the room”)

### Trends in Market Liquidity



Source: Yield curve error index from Bloomberg, ECB staff calculations.

# ANNEX

## Decentralised bond trading: Requires **Dealer** to link buyer & seller

	GOVERNEMENT BOND	EQUITY MARKET
Supply	Rising (funding for climate, military etc)	Declining (-120 Bn in Q1 2024)
Transaction pattern	Few trades of large size	Many trades of small size
Intermediation	Dealer-Dealer & Dealer-Client	All to all
Trading algorithm	Quote by dealer	Limit order by investor
High Frequency Trading	No (except US-T benchmark bonds)	Yes (very active)
Clearing	Bilateral	<b>Central Counterparty</b>
<b>Fragility of Market LIQ</b>	<b>HIGH (relies on Dealer Banks)</b>	<b>LOW</b>

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## Liquidity in fixed income markets under stress

- **On-the-run** Treasuries (Notional < 5% ): Daily Volume ~ \$ 400 BN with bid-ask spread < 1 BP and Non-bank Dealer market share ~ 60 %;
- **Off the run Treasuries** (older bonds; Notional > 95%): Daily Volume ~ \$ 150 BN with bid-ask spread > 10 BP and bank-centric
- US Treasury dislocation in March 2020: Stress in “world’s safe asset”
  - Many forced sellers of Treasuries as only asset which can be sold in crisis
  - But few buyers: Rise in Dealers’ balance sheet costs has reduced their warehousing capacity
- Fed = **“Dealer of last resort”**
- Gilt dislocation in September 2022
  - Mini-budget = fiscal policy shock
  - Fed = “Dealer of last resort”



## Further reading

Bank of England (2023) “Financial stability buy & sell tools: A gilt market case study” Quarterly Bulletin.

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