

Macroprudential Communication: Where Do We Stand Internationally?

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What Do We Know – debate in the wake of GFC


- Macroprudential policy aims to control tail risks to output.
 - Benefits in the future and costs immediate, giving rise to inaction bias (<u>Nier 2011</u>)
 - Compounded by political economy headwinds
- Objectives of macroprudential communication (<u>IMF 2014</u>):
 - generate willingness to act, i.e., to create commitment,
 - garner political support and public understanding,
 - enhance effectiveness (achieve benefits at lesser cost).
- Communication tools (<u>IMF 2014</u>):
 - Policy strategy—to lay out aims, toolkit, and indicators that would guide policy action
 - Records of meetings—to create a narrative around risks and policy actions, to create a record of decisions and votes
 - Periodic reports—to summarize and update risk assessment, describe past policy actions, and assess effectiveness of past actions

What Are We Learning—experiences since then

- Early warning indicators can be unreliable, leading to lack of protection (Miettinen and Nier, forthcoming).
- Shift towards frameworks involving three decision-points.
 - Activation of tools—early (preemptive) action for all tools that control risks in the time dimension.
 - **Tightening** of tools —in light of indications of cyclical increase or cross-sectional shifts in risks.
 - **Release** or relaxation—to prevent amplification of shocks in periods of stress.
- Useful to consider implications for communication for each.
 - Example: language for **activation** needs to
 - emphasize the objective to *protect* the economy (and banks, borrowers),
 - appeal to the logic of taking out *insurance* against future risks.

What Issues For Research: lead times and effects of measures

Average number of days between effective and announcement dates



Source: IMF Global Macroprudential Database.

Note: Averages are computed for policies announced from 2016 to 2023.

- Lead times=days between effective and announcements dates.
- Lead times can indicate objective of measures.
 - Longer lead times indicate that objective of slowing credit is not in focus.
 - Empirically, lead times are
 - long for measures on SIFIs as well as broad-based measures (CCyB),
 - much shorter for sectoral measures,
 - shortest for easing measures.

Extra slide: Focus on Credit Gap Can Lead to Lack of Buffers

- The Basel guidance <u>BCBS (2010)</u> refers to activating and increasing the buffer in response to "excessive credit growth", as measured by the credit-to-GDP gap.
- But: this gap can stay negative for an extended period of time, leading to a lack of buffer (Baba and others, 2020).

