

# Leverage across the production network and the transmission of monetary policy

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*The views in this presentation are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Central Bank or the Eurosystem.*

## Motivation

- ▶ **Production networks** important in shaping transmission of economic shocks
- ▶ **Financial frictions** acting as amplifier/accelerator of monetary policy shocks

## Research Question

How do direct and indirect exposures to leverage across the production network affect monetary policy transmission?

## Method

- ▶ Novel **up- and downstream leverage exposure measures**
- ▶ Study **non-linear effects on MP transmission** via panel local projections
- ▶ Rationalize empirical findings in **theoretical multi-sector model**

## Data

- ▶ **Country-sector panel** (monthly) for 20 euro area countries
- ▶ Dataset composed of **five building blocks**:
  1. **Macroeconomic indicators** at country level
  2. **Monetary policy shocks** via high-frequency identification (Altavilla et al., 2019; Jarociński and Karadi, 2020)
  3. **Sector-specific PPI and activity measures** at NACE-2 level granularity (64 sectors for each country)
  4. Data on **input-output linkages** by sector/country
  5. **Firm-level balance sheet** data from Orbis
- ▶ Final dataset spanning **2002m1 to 2024m12** (approx 250.000 observations)

Appendix: Data

# Econometric model

- ▶ MP shock interaction w/ **sector  $i$ 's leverage** ( $\varphi_{ic,t}$ )
- ▶ MP shock interaction w/ sector  $i$ 's exposure to **leverage position of suppliers** ( $\Phi_{ic,t}$ ) and **customers** ( $\tilde{\Phi}_{ic,t}$ )

$$\Delta_h y_{ic,t+h} = \underbrace{\beta_1^h \varphi_{ic,t_{12}-1} \times s_t}_{\text{Direct leverage effect}} + \underbrace{\beta_2^h \Phi_{ic,t_{12}-1} \times s_t}_{\text{Upstream effect}} + \underbrace{\beta_3^h \tilde{\Phi}_{ic,t_{12}-1} \times s_t}_{\text{Downstream effect}} + \underbrace{\phantom{\beta_2^h \Phi_{ic,t_{12}-1} \times s_t + \beta_3^h \tilde{\Phi}_{ic,t_{12}-1} \times s_t}}_{\text{Indirect leverage effect}} + \quad (1)$$

$$+ \beta_4^h s_t + \dots + \epsilon_{ic,t+h}$$

$$\Phi_{ic,t_{12}} = (1 - a_{ic,t_{12}}) \sum_{j,d} 1(j \neq i, d \neq c) \nu_{ic,jd,t_{12}} \times \varphi_{jd,t_{12}}$$


$$\tilde{\Phi}_{ic,t_{12}} = (1 - \tilde{a}_{ic,t_{12}}) \sum_{j,d} 1(j \neq i, d \neq c) \tilde{\nu}_{ic,jd,t_{12}} \times \varphi_{jd,t_{12}} \quad (2)$$

## Empirical results

### 1. Overall response

- ▶ Prices and production fall in first 3 years after the MP shock
- ▶ Higher leverage ( $\uparrow 10\%$  from mean) across the network implies additional dampening in prices and activity

Figure: Impulse responses to 25bp tightening shock




## Empirical results

### 2. Direct vs. indirect network leverage effects

- ▶ Direct and indirect leverage exposures amplify transmission to prices and output
- ▶ Significant relative importance of indirect effects

Figure: Impulse responses to 25bp tightening shock




## Empirical results

### 3. Up- and downstream network leverage effects

- Exposure to upstream suppliers' (downstream customers') leverage mitigates (reinforces) transmission to prices
  - ⇒ **Downstream demand vs. upstream cost-channel**

Figure: Impulse responses to 25bp tightening shock



## Overview

### Model:

- ▶ Static multi-sector model (Bigio and La'O, 2020):
  - ⇒ Two agents: firms and households
  - ⇒ Firms operate in different sectors ⇒ production network
- ▶ Sector-specific working capital constraints:
  - ⇒ Capture sectoral heterogeneity in monetary policy ( $i$ ) effects
  - ⇒ Link sector-specific impact to sectoral financial positions via  $\varphi_i$
  - ⇒ Financial friction introduces a sector-specific “cost channel”

### Analysis:

- ▶ Derive theoretical counterparts of empirical leverage measures
  - ⇒ Assess importance of sector-specific financial constraints for monetary policy transmission
  - ⇒ Take potential amplification effects from production network into account



## Key equations

- ▶ Firm profit equation:

$$\pi_i = p_i y_i - (1 + i \varphi_i) (l_i + \sum_{j \in K} p_j x_{i,j}) \quad (3)$$

- ▶ Sectoral (firm) optimality conditions:

$$p_i = (1 + i \varphi_i) m c_i, \quad (4)$$

$$m c_i = \frac{1}{z_i} \frac{(1 - \alpha_i)^{\alpha_i - 1}}{\alpha_i^{\alpha_i}} \left( \prod_{j \in K} p_j^{\nu_{i,j}} \right)^{1 - \alpha_i} \quad (5)$$

- ▶ Derivative of **sectoral prices**:

$$\frac{d}{di} \log(p_i) \approx \varphi_i + \sum_{j \neq i} \nu_{i,j} \varphi_j \quad (\text{direct} + \text{upstream}) \quad (6)$$


- ▶ Interest-rate sensitivity of **sectoral nominal output**:

$$p_i y_i = P^c \nu_{ci} C + \sum_{j \neq i} \frac{\nu_{j,i} (1 - \alpha_j)}{(1 + \varphi_j)^i} P^c \nu_{cj} C \quad (\text{downstream}) \quad (7)$$

## Two-sector comparative statics

- ▶ Calibrated two-sector version  $\Rightarrow$  industry vs. services
- ▶ **Exercise:** Vary **policy rate** and sector 2's **financial position**
- ▶ **Results:**
  - $\Rightarrow$  Higher  $i$  increases prices and reduces output across sectors
  - $\Rightarrow$  Increasing  $\varphi_2$  increases prices and reduces output in both sectors  $\Rightarrow$  **network transmission**

Figure: Policy rate and sectoral financial position



## Conclusion

### Research Question

How do direct and indirect exposures to leverage across the production network affect monetary policy transmission?

### Key results

- ▶ Network leverage exposure important amplifier of disinflationary impact
- ▶ Up- and downstream leverage exposure affect prices in opposite directions
- ▶ Rationalize in a multi-sector “cost-channel” model

Thank you very much for your attention!

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# Appendix

## *Overview*

1. Introduction
2. Data
3. Leverage measures
4. Econometric model
5. Empirical results
6. Theoretical model
7. Comparative statics

Introduction

## Appendix

### Literature

1. Theoretical studies on **production networks**:  
*Acemoglu et al. (2012); La'O and Tahbaz-Salehi (2022); Rubbo (2023); Bigio and La'O (2020)*
2. Empirical studies on **sectoral monetary policy transmission**  
*Ghassibe (2021); Durante et al. (2022); Borağan Aruoba and Drechsel (2024)*
3. **Financial frictions and monetary policy transmission**:  
*Bernanke and Gertler (1995); Bernanke et al. (1999); Ottonello and Winberry (2020); Jeenas (2018); Gilchrist et al. (2017); Adelino et al. (2023)*
4. **Monetary policy shocks in local projections**:  
*Borağan Aruoba and Drechsel (2024); Jordà and Taylor (2024); Ramey (2016); Ramey and Zubairy (2018); BarthIII and Ramey (2002)*

# Appendix

## *Data - overview*

### Country-sector euro area panel

- ▶ 2-digit NACE info on producer price index, industrial production, turnover and employment, by country. From STS Eurostat dataset

### Input-output data

- ▶ FIGARO tables at 2-digit NACE level (from 2010 to 2022).

### Firm-level financial constraints measures

- ▶ Information on firm level balance sheet data from ORBIS (using the cleaning method from Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2015))

Data

## Appendix

### Input-output linkages

- ▶ Annual input-output (IO) linkages from Eurostat's FIGARO database (2010-2023)

**Table:** Simplified Multi-Country Input-Output Table

		Intermediate use				Final use
		1A	2A	1B	2B	
Intermed. input	1A	$z_{11}^{A,A}$	$z_{12}^{A,A}$	$z_{11}^{A,B}$	$z_{12}^{A,B}$	$y_1^A$
	2A	$z_{21}^{A,A}$	$z_{22}^{A,A}$	$z_{21}^{A,B}$	$z_{22}^{A,B}$	$y_2^A$
	1B	$z_{11}^{B,A}$	$z_{12}^{B,A}$	$z_{11}^{B,B}$	$z_{12}^{B,B}$	$y_1^B$
	2B	$z_{21}^{B,A}$	$z_{22}^{B,A}$	$z_{21}^{B,B}$	$z_{22}^{B,B}$	$y_2^B$
VA+Labor		$VA_1^A$	$VA_2^A$	$VA_1^B$	$VA_2^B$	
Taxes		$T_1^A$	$T_2^A$	$T_1^B$	$T_2^B$	

## Appendix

### Data - Input-output linkages

$$a_{1A} = \frac{y_1^A}{z_{11}^{A,A} + z_{12}^{A,A} + z_{11}^{A,B} + z_{12}^{A,B} + y_1^A} \quad (8)$$

$$\tilde{a}_{1A} = \frac{VA_1^A + T_1^A}{z_{11}^{A,A} + z_{21}^{A,A} + z_{11}^{B,A} + z_{21}^{B,A} + VA_1^A + T_1^A} \quad (9)$$

► Square IO matrix:

$$\mathbf{A} = \begin{bmatrix} z_{11}^{A,A} & z_{12}^{A,A} & z_{11}^{A,B} & z_{12}^{A,B} \\ z_{21}^{A,A} & z_{22}^{A,A} & z_{21}^{A,B} & z_{22}^{A,B} \\ z_{11}^{B,A} & z_{12}^{B,A} & z_{11}^{B,B} & z_{12}^{B,B} \\ z_{21}^{B,A} & z_{22}^{B,A} & z_{21}^{B,B} & z_{22}^{B,B} \end{bmatrix} \quad (10)$$

## Appendix

### Data - Input-output linkages

- ▶ Matrix of technical coefficients **B**: divide each element of **A** by total of respective column:

$$\mathbf{B} = \begin{bmatrix} \nu_{11}^{A,A} & \nu_{12}^{A,A} & \nu_{11}^{A,B} & \nu_{12}^{A,B} \\ \nu_{21}^{A,A} & \nu_{22}^{A,A} & \nu_{21}^{A,B} & \nu_{22}^{A,B} \\ \nu_{11}^{B,A} & \nu_{12}^{B,A} & \nu_{11}^{B,B} & \nu_{12}^{B,B} \\ \nu_{21}^{B,A} & \nu_{22}^{B,A} & \nu_{21}^{B,B} & \nu_{22}^{B,B} \end{bmatrix} \quad (11)$$

- ▶ Matrix of allocation coefficients **C**: divide each element of **A** by the total of the rows:

$$\mathbf{C} = \begin{bmatrix} \tilde{\nu}_{11}^{A,A} & \tilde{\nu}_{12}^{A,A} & \tilde{\nu}_{11}^{A,B} & \tilde{\nu}_{12}^{A,B} \\ \tilde{\nu}_{21}^{A,A} & \tilde{\nu}_{22}^{A,A} & \tilde{\nu}_{21}^{A,B} & \tilde{\nu}_{22}^{A,B} \\ \tilde{\nu}_{11}^{B,A} & \tilde{\nu}_{12}^{B,A} & \tilde{\nu}_{11}^{B,B} & \tilde{\nu}_{12}^{B,B} \\ \tilde{\nu}_{21}^{B,A} & \tilde{\nu}_{22}^{B,A} & \tilde{\nu}_{21}^{B,B} & \tilde{\nu}_{22}^{B,B} \end{bmatrix} \quad (12)$$

## Appendix

### Data - Input-output linkages

- Account for higher-order effects by deriving Leontief and Gosh inverses (Acemoglu et al., 2016)

$$\mathbf{L} \equiv (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{B})^{-1} = \begin{bmatrix} \omega_{11}^{A,A} & \omega_{12}^{A,A} & \omega_{11}^{A,B} & \omega_{12}^{A,B} \\ \omega_{21}^{A,A} & \omega_{22}^{A,A} & \omega_{21}^{A,B} & \omega_{22}^{A,B} \\ \omega_{11}^{B,A} & \omega_{12}^{B,A} & \omega_{11}^{B,B} & \omega_{12}^{B,B} \\ \omega_{21}^{B,A} & \omega_{22}^{B,A} & \omega_{21}^{B,B} & \omega_{22}^{B,B} \end{bmatrix} \quad (13)$$

$$\mathbf{G} \equiv (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{C})^{-1} = \begin{bmatrix} \tilde{\omega}_{11}^{A,A} & \tilde{\omega}_{12}^{A,A} & \tilde{\omega}_{11}^{A,B} & \tilde{\omega}_{12}^{A,B} \\ \tilde{\omega}_{21}^{A,A} & \tilde{\omega}_{22}^{A,A} & \tilde{\omega}_{21}^{A,B} & \tilde{\omega}_{22}^{A,B} \\ \tilde{\omega}_{11}^{B,A} & \tilde{\omega}_{12}^{B,A} & \tilde{\omega}_{11}^{B,B} & \tilde{\omega}_{12}^{B,B} \\ \tilde{\omega}_{21}^{B,A} & \tilde{\omega}_{22}^{B,A} & \tilde{\omega}_{21}^{B,B} & \tilde{\omega}_{22}^{B,B} \end{bmatrix} \quad (14)$$



## Appendix

### *Indirect leverage measures*

Combine **sectoral leverage information** with **input-output data** to construct **sectoral up- and downstream leverage exposure measures**

$$\begin{aligned}\Phi_{ic,t_{12}} &= (1 - a_{ic,t_{12}}) \sum_{j,d} 1(j \neq i, d \neq c) \nu_{ic,jd,t_{12}} \times \lambda_{jd,t_{12}} \\ \tilde{\Phi}_{ic,t_{12}} &= (1 - \tilde{a}_{ic,t_{12}}) \sum_{j,d} 1(j \neq i, d \neq c) \tilde{\nu}_{ic,jd,t_{12}} \times \lambda_{jd,t_{12}}\end{aligned}\quad (15)$$

## Appendix

### Econometric model - full specification

$$\Delta_h y_{ic,t+h} = y_{ic,t+h} - y_{ic,t-1} = \quad (16)$$

$$\underbrace{\beta_1^h \varphi_{ic,t_{12}-1} \times s_t}_{\text{Direct financial constraints effect}} + \underbrace{\beta_2^h \Phi_{ic,t_{12}-1} \times s_t}_{\text{Upstream effect}} + \underbrace{\beta_3^h \tilde{\Phi}_{ic,t_{12}-1} \times s_t}_{\text{Downstream effect}} + \quad (17)$$

$$\underbrace{\beta_4^h a_{ic,t_{12}-1} \times s_t + \beta_5^h \tilde{a}_{ic,t_{12}-1} \times s_t + \beta_6^h s_t}_{\text{Non-network effect}}$$

$$+ \sum_{l=0}^L \gamma^h H_{t-l} + \sum_{l=1}^L \delta^h K_{t-l} + \sum_{l=0}^L \eta^h \Delta X_{t-l} + \theta_{t_{12}} + \kappa_{t+h} + \epsilon_{ic,t+h}$$

## Appendix

### Econometric model

- ▶ Matrix  $\mathbf{H}_t$ : sector-level variables unrelated to the monetary shock
- ▶ Matrix  $\mathbf{K}_t$ : lags of the dependent variables and shock variables
- ▶ Matrix  $\mathbf{X}_t$ : set of macro-financial controls

$$\mathbf{H}_t = \begin{bmatrix} a_{ic,t_{12}-1} \\ \tilde{a}_{ic,t_{12}-1} \\ \varphi_{ic,t_{12}-1} \\ \Phi_{ic,t_{12}-1} \\ \tilde{\Phi}_{ic,t_{12}-1} \end{bmatrix}, \quad \mathbf{K}_t = \begin{bmatrix} \Delta y_{ic,t} \\ \varphi_{ic,t_{12}-1} \times s_t \\ a_{ic,t_{12}-1} \times s_t \\ \tilde{a}_{ic,t_{12}-1} \times s_t \\ \Phi_{ic,t_{12}-1} \times s_t \\ \tilde{\Phi}_{ic,t_{12}-1} \times s_t \\ s_t \end{bmatrix}, \quad \mathbf{X}_t = \begin{bmatrix} \text{EA OIS3m rate} \\ \text{10y comp. EA sov. yield} \\ \text{EUR-USD FX rate} \\ \log(\text{CISS}) \\ \log(\text{Commodities PI}) \\ \log(\text{EA HICP}) \\ \log(\text{EA unempl. rate}) \\ \log(\text{sectoral empl.}) \end{bmatrix}$$

## Appendix

### *Econometric model - details*

#### **Estimation Method:**

- ▶ Model estimated in long-differences:

$$\Delta_h x_{t+h} = x_{t+h} - x_{t-1},$$

$$\Delta x_t = x_t - x_{t-1}$$

- ▶ Results are robust to levels estimation
- ▶ Interaction term scaling: one-unit change in coefficients refers to a 10 percent deviation of leverage from the mean
- ▶ Shock scaling: 25bp peak effect in first year


#### **Controls:**

- ▶ Lags for dependent/control and shock variables (baseline: 3 months)
- ▶ Fixed effects: monthly ( $\theta_t$ ) and Covid-19 dummy ( $\kappa_{t+h}$ )
- ▶ Cluster-robust standard errors (country-sector)

## Appendix

### 1. Overall financial constraints effect - Working Capital

Figure: Impulse responses to 25bp tightening shock - working capital




Main results

## Appendix

### 2. Direct vs. indirect network financial constraints effects - Working Capital

- ▶ Heterogeneous direct and indirect working capital effects
- ▶ Indirect effects particularly important for prices

Figure: Impulse responses to 25bp tightening shock - working capital




## Appendix

### 3. Up- and downstream network financial constraints effects - WC

- ▶ Downstream working capital constraints reinforce drop in prices and output
- ▶ Upstream constraints dampen drop in prices and output

Figure: Impulse responses to 25bp tightening shock - working capital



## Appendix

### *Theoretical model: overview*

- ▶ Multi-sector static model with production networks and sector-specific working capital constraint
- ▶ Builds on Bigio and La'O (2020), extended to:
  - ⇒ capture sectoral heterogeneity in monetary policy ( $i$ ) effects
  - ⇒ link transmission strength to sectoral financial positions via  $\varphi_i$ .
- ▶ Firm profit equation

$$\pi_i = p_i y_i - (1 + i\varphi_i)(l_i + \sum_{j \in K} p_j x_{i,j})$$



## Appendix

### *Theoretical model: key equations*

#### Sector optimality conditions

$$p_i = (1 + i\varphi_i)mc_i,$$

$$mc_i = \frac{1}{z_i} \frac{(1 - \alpha_i)^{\alpha_i - 1}}{\alpha_i^{\alpha_i}} \left( \prod_{j \in K} p_i^{\nu_{i,j}} \right)^{1 - \alpha_i}.$$

#### HH consumption and market clearing

$$y_i = c_i + \sum_{j \in K} x_{j,i} \quad \forall i$$

$$c_i = \frac{p^c}{p_i} \nu_{ci} C \tag{18}$$

## Appendix

### *Theoretical model: empirical mapping*

- ▶ Model-implied derivative of sectoral prices:

$$\frac{d}{di} \log(p_i) \approx \varphi_i + \sum_{j \neq i} \nu_{ij} \varphi_j \quad (\text{direct} + \text{upstream})$$

- ▶ Model-implied interest-rate sensitivity of sectoral nominal output:

$$p_i y_i = P^c \nu_{ci} C + \sum_{j \neq i} \frac{\nu_{j,i}(1 - \alpha_j)}{(1 + \varphi_j i)} P^c \nu_{cj} C \quad (\text{downstream})$$

## Appendix

### *Theoretical model: comparative statics*

- ▶ Two-sector model calibrated to match European **industry** (sector 1) and **services** (sector 2).
- ▶ Input-output shares ( $\nu_{i,j}$ ) calibrated to Eurostat FIGARO data:
  - ⇒ Industry: 60% industry, 40% services inputs
  - ⇒ Services: 20% industry, 80% services inputs
- ▶ Final consumption shares ( $\nu_{ci}$ ): 55% goods, 45% services (COICOP).
- ▶ Other parameters (e.g.  $\varphi_i$ ,  $\alpha_i$ ) set uniformly across sectors.


Main exercise

## Appendix

### *Theoretical model: comparative statics*

- Vary  $\nu_{12}$  to capture sector 1's reliance on sector 2
  - ⇒ Higher  $\nu_{12}$  raises sector 2 output, lowers sector 1 output
  - ⇒ No sectoral price effect ⇒ price sensitivity tied to financing conditions

Figure: Policy rate and sectoral input shares




## Appendix

### *Theoretical model: comparative statics*

- ▶ Vary sector 2's **financial position**  $\varphi_2$  and sector 1's reliance on services via **input share**  $\nu_{12}$
- ▶ Tightening in  $\varphi_2$  and higher  $\nu_{12}$  amplify contraction in sector 1 output

Figure: Sectoral financial position and input shares



## Appendix

### *Theoretical model: comparative statics - network amplification*

- ▶ **Full vs. isolationist economy** w/o input linkages ( $\alpha_i = 1$ )
- ▶ In most adverse financial scenario ( $i = 0.1, \varphi_2 = 1$ ):
  - ⇒ Upward effect on sector 1's prices is 44 ppt. lower in isolationist economy (baseline: 53%)
  - ⇒ Output drop is mitigated by 34 ppt. in the isolationist model (baseline: -38%)

**Figure:** Policy rate and sectoral financial friction - network amplification

