



The usefulness of inflation indicators

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SUERF-B_Italia-ECB-Suomen_P-Oesterreiche_NB workshop


28 November 2022, Mexico City

*The views expressed are those of the speaker and not necessarily those of the BIS.

Inflation forecasts for 2022 and 2023

Inflation rates, forecasts and targets



In per cent



¹ Cleveland Fed's CPI nowcast for August 2022. ² Consensus Forecast for India corresponds to the fiscal year beginning April. ³ June for ZA; Q2 for AU; July for rest. ⁴ Average annual changes, year-end changes for RU, Latin American countries. ⁵ CN, EA, and US do not officially describe their monetary policy framework as inflation targeting.

Sources: Knotek and Zaman (2014); Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland; Consensus Economics; Datastream; national data; BIS calculations.


Inflation forecast have underestimated inflation since 2021




Source: Boissay, De Fiore and Kharroubi (2022)

Inflation forecasts for 2023 increased yet still sharp/fast disinflation wrt 2022

Changes in forecasts for 2023¹




Quarterly forecasts (yoy changes)




Some evidence that inflation dynamics is changing


Sectoral price changes become increasingly similar...²




...and sectoral price spillovers are increasing³



Sensitivity of wages to past inflation mildly higher...⁴



... while that of prices to past wage growth is stable⁴



Source: De Fiore, Lombardi and Rees (2022)

The forecasting inflation challenge


A taxonomy of inflation indicators

Indicator	Timeliness	Informativeness on drivers (diagnosis)	Forecasting ability (prognosis)	Robustness to regime shift
1. Current inflation, including narrower measures	High	None	Often hard-to-beat benchmarks	May reflect an ongoing regime shift
2. Granular measures (eg price similarity, spillovers)	Generally high	Mostly suggestive	Unknown	Greater commonality may help detect turning points or regime changes
3a. Expectations: markets-based	Very high	None	Good but can also incorporate shifts in risk appetite	Changes in the distribution may help predict a regime shift
3b. Expectations: survey-based	Generally low	Relevant, esp. under unanchored expectations	Good but might come with biases	Looking at the full distribution may reveal signs of a shift
4a. Models: Time series	Very high	Limited	Typically good	May be unstable around regime shifts
4b. Models: (semi)-structural	Low	High	Varies	Low


Inflation: Always and every where a monetary phenomenon?

Money and inflation in low- and high-inflation regimes

Money is closely linked to inflation...




...but only in high-inflation regimes




Note: Excess money growth is defined as the difference between broad money growth and real GDP growth.

Money helps predict the post-pandemic inflation surge



Inflation: global or local?

US inflation spillovers to other countries' inflation



Variances share from 15 years rolling regressions for 23 countries.

Sources: IMF; OECD; World Bank; Refinitiv Datastream; national data; BIS.

Conclusions

- Forecasting inflation is challenging
- Clear breaks in the dynamics of inflation post-Covid
 - Unusual shocks, including global ones
 - Evidence of change in «slope parameters»: eg faster pass-through
- Mixed evidence from various indicators and models
 - So far limited evidence of unanchoring of inflation expectations (and forecasts)
 - The quantity theory of money strikes back when inflation is high
 - Some evidence that international inflation spillovers resume