



OESTERREICHISCHE NATIONALBANK
EUROSYSTEM

Panel II: Macroprudential Policy in Austria – Country experience

Bratislava, 5 October 2022

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
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Consistency of all financial stability analyses

- Interaction between macroprudential buffers, resolution, too-big-to-fail, deposit guarantee scheme and crisis management
- Consistent ex ante systemic risk analysis with ex post crisis management/resolution



To evaluate the overall financial stability impact of bank failures and to identify systemically important banks is a core function of financial stability analyses.

High level principles: systemic resilience as basis for buffer decisions

High resilience

- Maintain top rating, secure favorable refinancing costs and improve capital adequacy of Austrian banks

Incentives for markets

- Market participants can reduce systemic risk exposure or be subject to capital buffers

Targeted measures

- Different instruments to address various risk channels

A steady hand...




- Building buffers takes time and is sometimes fraught with resistance
- Avoiding reputational effects of revoking buffer decisions that have not been (fully) implemented

Covid-19 : buffer use instead of buffer release

OeNB/FMA explicitly refrained from reducing the combined buffer requirement for Austrian banks to maintain market confidence during the pandemic.

- Active communication to banks / markets to use their buffers – instead of buffer release – in times of crisis with sufficient time to rebuild buffers.
- Austrian banks had EUR 38.3 bn of CET1 at their disposal (thereof ~ EUR 18 bn macroprudential buffers) to absorb the impact of the pandemic.


The communication proved to be successful:

-  The rating of the Austrian banking system remained stable
-  Funding conditions remained excellent
-  Credit supply remained strong

Resilience: structural buffers


- Systemic risk buffer (SyRB) and O-SII buffer apply to a subset of banks since 2016
- FMSB announced in September 2022 cumulative SyRB and O-SII buffer rates of up to 2.5%; 0.25% phase-in over the next 2 years effective with 1.1.2023
- Objective: to address heightened systemic risks, improve Austrian banks' capital ratios also in international comparison and ensure the banking system's top rating

CET1 ratio in Austria and distance to the EU average




Setting of Austrian buffer decisions: Residential real estate price developments

RRE loans to households



Source: BSI Index of Notional Stocks (SDW).

RRE price development



Quelle: Data Science Service GmbH, TU Wien, Prof. Feilmayr, OeNB, EZB.

Since 2016: enhanced public communication, guidance and BBMs

September
2016

FMSB issues a **qualitative communication** on sustainable lending standards

- Loan decision based on conservative loan-to-value (LTV) ratios
- Level of indebtedness of households, measured by debt-to-income (DTI) and debt-service-to-income (DSTI) ratios, should be such that households are also able to pay back their loans under stress (e.g. by a decline in household income or unexpected payment obligations)

April and
June
2018

Enhanced **public communication by OeNB** (presentation of 35th FSR) **and FMA**:

- 20% down payment for RRE lending desirable, debt service not more than 30-40% of households net income; maturities at origination should not exceed 35 or 40 years

September
2018

Enhanced communication and **quantitative guidance by FMSB** (17th Meeting)

March
2022

Recommendation by the FMSB to the FMA **to introduce BBM**

August
2022

BBM regulation enters **into force**

- 90% LTV; 40% DSTI; max. loan majority of 35 years; 20% exemption bucket

Credit-GDP-Gap (main indicator):

- Based on **encompassing** credit aggregate from national financial account


Additional credit-GDP-Gaps:

- Based on MFI (ECB, domestic): loans to NFC and households (incl. NPISH)
- Household debt (incl. NPISH)
- NFC debt

Additional indicators (in part based on ESRB recommendation, ESRB/2014/1):

- Austrian Financial Stability Indicator (AFSI)
- Credit growth
- Credit quality
- Risk weights
- Banking sector: leverage, interest margin
- Real estate sector
- HH and NFC indebtedness
- Credit spreads
- Current account
- Development of insolvencies

Gap | households and firms



Legal background: Austrian law relies on **main indicator**, deviation is possible in **exceptional** cases but requires **strong and well substantiated arguments** → **burden of proof on authority**.



Reduce complexity: by removing regulatory overlaps between capital buffers and minimum requirements (MREL, Leverage Ratio)



Increase resilience: by maintaining current minimum and buffer requirements and building additional capital for crises



BCBS compliance: by sticking to internationally agreed standards (level playing field) and coupling buffer releases with payout restrictions

Danke für Ihre Aufmerksamkeit

Thank you for your attention

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