The Circular Relationship Between Productivity Growth and Real Interest Rate

SUERF-OeNB Workshop: « How to raise r*? » 15 September 2021

Gilbert Cette
Banque de France, AMSE and NEOMA Business School


Large input from Bergeaud, Cette and Lecat (2019), BdF working paper n° 734

1. Before the crisis: A general productivity slowdown

Average annual growth rate of labor productivity per hour In the US

Smoothed indicator (HP filter, λ = 500) - Whole economy – 1891-2019 – In %

Source: Bergeaud, Cette and Lecat (2016) - See: www.longtermproductivity.com




- Productivity growth levels at the lowest
- Productivity slowdown except during the short decade 1995-2005

1. Before the crisis: A general productivity slowdown

Average annual growth rate of labor productivity per hour In the main advanced economic areas

Smoothed indicator (HP filter, λ = 500) - Whole economy – 1891-2019 – In %

Source: Bergeaud, Cette and Lecat (2016) - See: www.longtermproductivity.com



- Productivity growth levels: everywhere at the lowest outside war periods
- o Except in the US during the short decade 1995-2005, productivity slowdown in all areas for 4 decades
- Need of common factors to explain this general slowdown
- Productivity puzzle: productivity gains from digitalization are not yet s visible at the global level

2. One of the possible suspects: decreasing financial constraints


- Numerous explanations of this productivity slowdown
- This long run productivity slowdown is universal, whatever the institutions, the productivity level, the ICT and technological diffusion... Common factors?
- Aghion, Bergeaud, Cette, Lecat and Maghin (ABCLM, 2019) and Bergeaud, Cette and Lecat (BCL, 2020): at least a part of the explanation could be the decrease in financial constraints

> The story:

- Decrease in real interest rates and more widely in financial constraints...
- ... Allows inefficient incumbent firms to remain on the market...
- ... May discourage potentially more efficient firms from entering the market...
- ... Allocation (cleansing) mechanisms linked to financial constraints Increasing mis-allocation of production factors and General productivity slowdown
- - **У financial constraints → У growth** (from productivity slowdown)
 - y growth → y real interest rates and y financial constraints

2. One of the possible suspects: decreasing financial constraints

Quartiles and median of real long-term interest rates – In % 10-yr government bond yields) over 17 developed countries - Whole economy – 1950-2017 Source: Bergeaud, Cette and Lecat (2019)



- Long term general decrease of real interest rates and of financial constraints
- o Could be a common factor to explain at least partly the general productivity slowdown

On individual data, results apparently contrasted in the literature regarding the impact of financial constraints/high real interest rates on average productivity growth

Favorable impact

Through cleansing mechanisms (closing of low-productivity firms and reallocation of their labour and capital to more productive firms) Gropp, Rocholl and Saadi (2017); ...

Detrimental impact


Through IT investment, R&D, innovation, management quality... Aghion et al. (2012); Duval, Hong and Timmer (2017); Manarasi and Pierri (2018); ...

- ABCLM (2019) estimate these two mechanisms in a unifying framework, on a dataset of French firms
 - Test this formally using information on productivity and credit access of French firms
 - Show that a credit easing shock has the two opposite effects:
 - It increases the productivity of the incumbents
 - It reduces the exit (the cleansing), particularly for the least productive firms
 - Use of a natural experiment to confirm these effects:
 - Euro area banks may use corporate loans as collateral in their refinancing operations with the ECB
 - Unanticipated annoncement at the end of 2011 of an enlargement of credit quotation to be eligible from the beginning of 2012
 - Exogenous positive shock of access to credit for numerous companies
 - Appear that:

Default risk decreased for firms which were hit by the eligibility shock This effect is stronger for low-productivity firms


- ➢ If the two mechanisms coexist, which one dominates currently (before the COVID crisis) at the macro level?
- Seems to be the first one (favourable impact)
 See Reis (2013); Gopinath *et al.* (2015), Gorton-Ordonez (2015); G. Cette, J. Fernald and B. Mojon (2016), C. Borio, E. Kharroubi, C. Upper and F. Zampolli (2016), Bergeaud, BCL (2020), ...
- Productivity impact of financial constraints at the aggregate level:
 An inverted U curve

We would currently be at the left part of the curve



Productivity level of the frontier firms and of the laggard French firms

Source: Bouche, Cette & Lecat, 2019 - Large panel of French firms
Productivity frontier: Overall (cross-sectorial) fixed number of the most productive firms in each sector (10% in average of the observation number)
Median by category – log in Base 0 in 1991



- Growing distance between productivity frontier and laggard firms
- o Allocation problem observed in France as in other advanced countries (see Andrew et al. 2015, 2016, ...)
- Could contribute to explain at least partly the general low productivity growth

4. What to expect from the COVID crisis in the medium term?

- Again, two mechanims at play, in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic:
 - O Dramatic financial constrainst decrease from both:
 - More expansive monetary policy
 - Large fiscal support to firms
 - → Reduces the exits (the cleansing
 Symptom: huge observed decrease of firm failures and bankruptcies
 - → Negative impact on productivity growth
 - Huge acceleration of the digitalization
 - → Positive impact on productivity growth
- Which one of the two mechanisms will dominate in the medium term?
 - Open question
- Exit strategies: two risks
 - Not to support performant firms enough → Bankruptcies and not good allocations
 - To support unperformant firms too much and too long → No bankruptcies and bad allocation