# Gender, Money and Finance


**UERF/JVI/OeNB Conference** 

Paola Profeta

Bocconi University and Axa Research Lab on Gender Equality




#### Women on monetary policy committees across countries




Note: The figure shows the share of women on Monetary Policy Committees in 2016.

Masciandaro, Profeta, Romelli (2020) Do Women matter on monetary policy boards? WP Baffi Carefin -Bocconi


#### Women on monetary policy committees over time



### **Women Governor or Deputy over time**




#### Women on monetary policy committees



Note: The figure shows the percentage of Monetary Policy Committees that never had a women during the entire 2002-2016 period, the percentage with no women in any given year, and the percentage with one or two and more women.

#### Women on monetary policy committees: 2002 and 2016



Note: Figure a) shows the average share of women on Monetary Policy Committees by world regions in 2002 (or first available year) and 2016 (or last available year). EAP: East Asia & Pacific; ECA: Europe & Central Asia; LAC: Latin America & Caribbean; MENA: Middle East & North Africa; NA: North America; SA: South Asia; and SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. Figure b) shows the average share of women on Monetary Policy Committees by income group in 2002 (or first available year) and 2016 (or last available year).

#### Women on monetary policy committees

		OLS					Ordered logit			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	
	Sh	are of won	nen	Share of	f women (	Potential)	Number of women			
Staff gender ratio	0.198*			0.177*			5.349**			
	(0.105)			(0.106)			(2.354)			
Gender gap index		0.125			0.112			-3.309		
		(0.356)			(0.339)			(9.011)		
Central bank independence			-0.118			-0.116			-3.585	
•			(0.106)			(0.102)			(2.209	
Controls:										
OECD FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
MPC size FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Income FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Legal origin FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	182	163	164	182	163	164	182	163	164	
Number of countries	66	61	59	66	61	59	66	61	59	

# **Women Governor or Deputy**

	OLS			O	rdered logi	t	Logit		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Share of women			Num	ber of won	nen	Presence of women		
Staff gender ratio	0.266*			12.412**			9.053**		
	(0.156)			(5.166)			(4.530)		
Gender gap index		-0.695			1.989			-6.435	
		(0.615)			(14.974)			(16.022)	
Central bank independence			-0.095			-4.241			-4.977
			(0.185)			(3.637)			(3.847)
Controls:									
OECD FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MPC size FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Income FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Legal origin FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	182	163	164	136	127	125	182	162	164
Number of countries	66	61	59	48	45	44	66	60	59

#### Women and monetary policy decisions

## Women on committees and monetary policy

			0]	GMM					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
									00 Total 17702107
Share of women × Inflation		0.708**	0.857**		0.698*	0.758*		0.729*	0.882**
		(0.338)	(0.402)		(0.380)	(0.389)		(0.391)	(0.402)
Share of women			-2.546			-0.492*			-0.961**
			(1.527)			(0.289)			(0.447)
Inflation	0.228***	0.119*	0.092	0.327***	0.233***	0.225***	0.345***	0.248***	0.229***
	(0.046)	(0.064)	(0.069)	(0.042)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.043)
Output gap	-0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Lagged policy rate	0.476***	0.473***	0.471***	0.864***	0.862***	0.862***	0.881***	0.883***	0.880***
	(0.081)	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Constant	1.882***	1.987***	2.369***	0.303***	0.330***	0.403***	0.193**	0.195**	0.351**
	(0.575)	(0.608)	(0.709)	(0.089)	(0.068)	(0.076)	(0.094)	(0.087)	(0.134)
							, ,		
Observations	690	703	696	1,418	1,382	1,382	1,418	1,382	1,382
R-squared	0.354	0.377	0.374	0.938	0.940	0.940			-
Hansen J test							35.11 [1.00]	30.79 [1.00]	27.91 [1.00]
Number of countries	60	60	60	37	37	37	37	37	37

### Women governor and monetary policy

			O	GMM					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Women on top X Inflation		0.192	0.226*		0.209***	0.214***		0.218***	0.238***
-		(0.123)	(0.131)		(0.056)	(0.060)		(0.046)	(0.045)
Women on top			-1.061*			-0.065			-0.309*
1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 · 1 ·			(0.622)			(0.117)			(0.165)
Inflation	0.228***	0.122**	0.105	0.327***	0.268***	0.267***	0.349***	0.287***	0.283***
	(0.046)	(0.060)	(0.066)	(0.042)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.044)
Output gap	-0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Lagged policy rate	0.476***	0.487***	0.490***	0.864***	0.862***	0.862***	0.875***	0.876***	0.876***
	(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Constant	1.882***	2.098***	2.321***	0.303***	0.350***	0.359***	0.219**	0.249***	0.294***
	(0.575)	(0.668)	(0.711)	(0.089)	(0.053)	(0.056)	(0.094)	(0.079)	(0.088)
Observations	690	703	696	1,418	1,382	1,382	1,418	1,382	1,382
R-squared	0.354	0.384	0.383	0.938	0.940	0.940			
Hansen J test							33.90 [1.00]	33.22 [1.00]	32.30 [1.00]
Number of countries	60	60	60	37	37	37	37	37	37

#### Main result

Central bank committees with a higher presence of women are characterized by a more hawkish behavior in monetary policy.

General results from research (Profeta, 2020)

Women on boards have effects on:

- Selection
- Performance
- The Agenda