Liquidity Creation, Capital Requirements, and Regulatory Arbitrage

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This paper

- Motivation: Liquidity creation vs. excessive leverage
- Banks can create liquidity ("money") in two ways:
 - Issue equity and hold-to-maturity (traditional banking)
 - Market-based liquidity creation (shadow banking)
- Role for macroprudential regulation?

Fire sale pricing



 What is the effect of regulatory arbitrage through shadow banking?

Findings

- 1. Fire-sale externality leads to *excessive* fire sales
 - But: too much or too little money creation
- 2. Macroprudential regulation
 - Limit asset sales with Pigouvian tax, or capital / liquidity requirements
- 3. Regulatory arbitrage undermines regulation
 - Shadow banking sector grows too large
 - Solution: Subsidy on bank equity

Mechanics

• Banks generate Liquidity Benefits (à la Stein 2012)

"Money creation" is non-monotonic in asset sales



by creating safe claims ("Money")





- Late investors have endowment W and productive technology g; can buy assets after pessimistic news
- **Friction**: Financing terms are non-contractable, effect on collateral constraint trough fire-sale price

Social Optimum Equilibrium

Liquidation

Regulation & Regulatory Arbitrage

- Targeting asset sales directly (Pigou)
- Effective if not regulatory arbitrage possible
- <u>Otherwise:</u> Shadow banks operate outside the regulatory perimeter
- High leverage: Shadow banks engage only in market-based liquidity creation
- Shadow banking sector grows too large; macroprudential policy is offset completely
- Solution: Subsidy on bank equity
- Low leverage: constrained efficient not attained

Optimal and equilibrium size of shadow banking as a

not internalized

 Asset sales do not only create liquidity, they can also destroy it

$$M(\eta) = (1 - \eta)R_L + \eta \min\left[\frac{R_1}{g'}, W\right]$$

- Result:
 - Equilibrium asset sales are always excessive
 - But: Leverage can be too high or too low

function of R_1

