

# *THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CENTRAL BANKING IN THE DIGITAL AGE*

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Oesterreichische Nationalbank Conference, Vienna, 29 May 2017

# A CONCEPTION OF CENTRAL BANKING TODAY

- *Nature:* Pivot of the monetary-cum-credit system
- *Purpose:* Monetary system stability
- *Activities:* Twofold:
  - Changing state's consolidated b/sheet
  - Constraining private banking system's b/sheets
- *Problem:* Excessive power?

# *PIVOT* OF MONEY-CREDIT SYSTEM

- Two types of central bank money:
  - Physical notes
  - Reserve accounts
  - Hence, a tiered monetary/payments system
- Three things taken for granted:
  - Private banking inevitably exists
  - The money and credit systems are inter-twined
  - The central bank is called into existence as liquidity reinsurer
- To ban central banking, or fractional-reserve banking?

# *PURPOSE OF THE MONETARY AUTHORITY*

- Paul Volcker in 1990:
  - *“I insist that neither monetary policy nor the financial system will be well served if a central bank loses interest in, or influence over, the financial system”*
- Monetary-system stability:
  - Stability of central bank money in terms of goods and services
  - Stability of deposit money in terms of central bank money

# *MONEY-CREDIT CONSTITUTION*

- 1) A target for inflation (or some other nominal variable)
  - 2) Requirement for banking institutions to hold reserves (or assets exchangeable into reserves) that increases with riskiness and social significance
  - 3) Liquidity-reinsurance facilities
  - 4) Resolution regime
  - 5) Constraints on central bank balance sheets
- (4) and (5) new relative to 19<sup>th</sup> century *MCC*

# SCHEMATIC BANKING SYSTEM CONSTRAINTS

- $X\%$  of short-term liabilities ( $S$ ) to be 'covered' by liquid assets, discounted to the value attributed to them by the central bank ( $d.LA$ )
- Where  $x = 100\%$ , there is full liquid assets cover for short-term liabilities.
- Residual assets ( $(1-d).LA$  plus assets ineligible at the central bank) to be funded in prescribed minimum proportions by common equity ( $K$ ) and debt that can be converted into equity without disruption ( $B$ ), plus any 'uncovered' short-term liabilities ( $(1-x).S$ ).
- $K$  and  $B$  higher, the riskier or lumpier the asset portfolio.

# THE CHALLENGES FROM FINTECH

- Will CB Money remain final settlement asset?
- Will (and should) fractional-reserve banking continue?
- Might everyone bank with the central bank?
  - If not everyone, more intermediaries?
- Will the scope of prudential reg/sup widen?
  - Will its focus shift to cyber integrity?

# A NEW PIVOT: THE CLEARING HOUSE

- Settlement in bundles of designated financial assets (*eligible instruments*)
- PvP and DvP succeeded by DvD
- Clearing house as:
  - Guarantor of deferred transactions
  - Gate-keeper to being a market maker
  - Minimum haircut and margin requirements, including macro-pru
  - Perhaps Market Maker of Last Resort
  - The new Pivot



# STICKINESS OF FIAT MONEY

- Miles away from settlement in bundles of real assets
- Government underpins money via legal tender laws
- Government unlikely to give up seigniorage easily
- We (citizens) are unlikely to be comfortable with a private body issuing fiat money and so controlling the inflation tax

# CENTRAL BANKING FINTECH

- 1) Central bank money stored in cards, i-phones etc
    - The new bank notes: big deal operationally, but not profound
  - 2) E-central bank money
    - Debate has tended to be about negative rates etc, but
    - If means holding an account at central bank, very big deal because entails a banking relationship with the state
- Cannot see households being able to borrow directly from CB
  - If so, a tiered payments/credit system continues

# BEYOND BANKS AS WE KNOW THEM

- Charles Hawtrey a century ago:
  - *“Anyone who can borrow from the central bank can thereby procure legal tender money”*
- Corollaries:
  - Anyone who can procure legal tender can offer private monetary liabilities,
  - Anyone who can offer monetary liabilities should be regulated as a monetary institution.
- Applies to shadow banking: ie a normative truth already, affected by fintech only in potential breadth of application

# BEYOND PRU-SUP: BACK TO PLUMBING

- Easy to take the deep infrastructure for granted. Eg:
  - Transferability of negotiable instruments
  - Dematerialisation of money-market instruments and securities
  - Finality of book-entry transfer
- Today:
  - Cyber laws and norms: eg ownership of money necessary for adjudication of property-right disputes
  - Proof against cyber wars: closing down payments and settlement systems
- *Central banks not as fiscal or regulatory operators, but as plumbers*

# CONCLUSIONS-I

- Central bank money will survive as the final settlement asset
- As such central banks will remain the pivot
- But a role they could eventually share with central-counterparty clearing houses

# CONCLUSIONS-II

- Fractional-reserve banking will continue, so the money and credit systems will remain inter-twined
  - But many more types of intermediary involved in payments services, clearing or liquidity-insurance might gain access to the central bank
  - If so, that should be recognised formally rather than stumbled into in the midst of crisis
  - Thus, regulation and oversight of private monetary institutions is likely to become broader

# CONCLUSIONS-III

- Will continue to conduct financial operations that reshape the state's consolidated balance sheet
  - But more likely to find themselves acting as Market Makers of Last Resort
- Central banker as plumber is likely to be resurrected.
- Challenge is to minimise the scope and depth of their role, and to ensure that it enjoys wide public and political support.
  - Might be a bigger deal than technological change itself.

