



Central Banking in the XXI century: never say never.

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State of the art (literally)

- □ Central banking is an art (R.G. Hawtrey, 1932)
- ☐ Arts are as much about rules as about revolutions:

 "Learn the rules like a pro, so you can break them like an artist"

 (Picasso)
- ☐ Central bankers learned (Taylor) rules for a long while, but broke them when they looked inadequate.
- ☐ They stand ready to do it again if/when necessary.
- ☐ Key lesson: never say never.



State of the euro area

- 1. Exceptionally expansionary monetary policies.
- 2. Low inflation and a fragile recovery.
- ☐ The diagnosis is far from obvious:
 - Demographics?
 - Declining productivity?
 - Financial cycle?
- Whatever the explanation, this experience raises questions on the very foundations of MP.



Three essay questions on monetary policy

1. Objectives: is it sensible to stick to price stability?

2. Effectiveness: are we using the right tools to achieve it?

- 3. <u>Side effects</u>: what is the cost of pursuing a price stability target today?
 - ✓ Risk taking
 - ✓ Inequality



(1) Objectives of MP

The idea of aiming for an inflation rate "below but close to 2%" is under scrutiny:

- □ Perhaps CBs should focus on longer horizons (Issing, 2016)
- □ Perhaps low inflation is beneficial if it is caused by supply shocks (Borio, 2015)
- ☐ Perhaps there comes a point where the costs of monetary expansion exceed its benefits.



(1) Objectives of MP


Maybe. However:

- > The ZLB limits CBs' room for action.
- High debt increases the risk of a 'debt deflation' spiral.
- Temporary low-flation can escalate into a long-term problem: de-anchoring risk.
- Costs and side effects of MP are elusive (more on this later).



From short to long run: de-anchoring

- ☐ The correlation between short and long-term inflation expectations is a proxy of de-anchoring risk.
- ☐ In the EA, this correlation has been highly since 2015:



- ☐ Investors worry about low inflation in the long run.
- ☐ This could be a bad time to question the target.

Source: Natoli and Sigalotti (2015).



(2) Effectiveness of MP

Fine ... but is MP working?

- ☐ The ZLB reduces its degrees of freedom
- ☐ The crises have impaired its transmission mechanism
- ☐ In general you cannot "push on a string".


Certainly. However:

- Interest rates can go negative.
- > CBs can work with quantities as well as prices (EAPP).
- > We must turn to models to answer this question.



Quantifying the impact of EAPP

The effects of EAPP in Italy



- \square On a 3-year horizon: GDP +2%, inflation +1%.
- □ GDP data is so far consistent with our projections.
- ☐ Inflation is lower (weak global demand, low oil prices).




What else can be done?

- ☐ An effective stabilization typically requires a combination of interventions.
- □ MP works, but it should not be 'the only game in town'.
- ☐ The relatively weak performance of the eurozone might be down to fiscal policy being
 - "less available and effective" than elsewhere (Draghi, 2014)
 - "much tighter than demanded by economic conditions" (Bernanke, 2015)



The fiscal stance in the euro area

Cyclically adjusted primary balance in advanced economies



Source: IMF staff estimates.



(3) Financial stability consideration

Should financial stability considerations interfere with MP?

- ☐ Investors risk more when monetary conditions are loose
- ☐ Low rates may chip away at banks' profitability
- ☐ MP is also a financial stability tool (Stein, 2013)


Undisputable. However:

- □ Price and financial stability are complementary in the medium run: there can be no real safety without growth.
- ☐ There are no signs of exuberance in the euro area.



Assessing the financial cycle

- □ CBs routinely monitor a range of financial indicators ...
- ☐ The "credit cycle" is (still) in a negative phase.
- We do not have an excessive risk taking problem.



Source: Banca d'Italia Financial Stability Report, November 2015

- □ ... but do prudential authorities monitor the macroeconomy?
- Excessive restrictions could slow down the recovery, increasing rather than reducing aggregate risks.



(4) MP and inequality

Does the current MP stance favor the rich?

- ☐ Savers are 'expropriated' via low interest rates.
- ☐ Capital gains accrue mostly to wealthy households.
- □ Refinancing and OMOs benefit banks rather than the people.

Inequality lies outside CBs' mandates. Yet this debate is important for two reasons:

- > Social and economic stability go hand in hand.
- > CB Independence may be at stake.



What are the distributional effects of MP?


- ☐ This is a general equilibrium problem. MP affects:
 - Cash and deposits (-)
 - Bonds and equities (+)
 - House prices (+)
 - Wages and employment (+)
- Bernanke (2015) proposes a simple thought experiment: "If the average working person were given the choice of the status quo (current Fed policies) and a situation with both a weaker labor market and lower stock prices (tighter Fed policies), which would he or she choose?"

Most probably the latter.



The impact of the 2011-2012 ECB interventions:


estimates based on micro data from the Survey of Income and Wealth





The impact of the 2011-2012 ECB interventions:

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


1. The rich benefited from financial gains.



The impact of the 2011-2012 ECB interventions:

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


- 1. The rich benefited from financial gains.
- 2. The poor benefited from <u>cheaper debt</u> and higher <u>labor income</u>.



The impact of the 2011-2012 ECB interventions:

estimates based on micro data from the Survey of Income and Wealth



- 1. The rich benefited from financial gains.
- 2. The poor benefited from cheaper debt and higher labor income.
- 3. Inequality decreased.



Conclusions

- > Central banks have been tested severely.
- The conventional wisdom we inherited from the Great Moderation era is also (rightly) under examination:

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"The state of macro is good" (Blanchard, 2008)
"How could we get it so wrong?" (Krugman, 2008)
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- ➤ Both the policy and the academic challenge are far from over.
- > But some tentative lessons can be drawn as of today.



Conclusions

What did we learn?

- i. Stick to price stability.
- ii. Monetary policy works, but it should not be left alone.
- iii. Risk taking and inequality are important in principle but (as of today) negligible in practice.
- iv. Never say never.



Thank you

