• Linkedin
  • Twitter

2004/3
Northern and Eastern Enlargement of EMU:
Do Structural Reforms Matter?

by Andrew Hughes Hallett, Svend E. Hougaard Jensen and Christian Richter,Vienna, 2004

ISBN 3-902109-22-X
 
This paper studies the incentives to join or enlarge a monetary union under alternative assumptions about the extent of market reform within the union and in candidate countries. Lack of labour mobility, wage/price flexibility or fiscal reform brings costs for both new entrants and in the existing union. Countries will only want to join a union where there has been sufficient reform, and where markets are more flexible than their own. But existing members will want the same properties of their new partners as well. Fiscal restrictions, or a lack of fiscal flexibility, will exaggerate this incentive mismatch and may delay the necessary reforms.
 
Chapters
The Issues
A theoretical framework: An overview
A quantitative assessment: an “orders of magnitude” calculation
An extended empirical analysis: A simulation approach
EMU and structural reform
Is there a link between fiscal constraints and structural reform?
Concluding remarks
Appendix: Details of the Oxford Economic Forecasting (OEF) model

Additional Info

Keywords: EMU, Enlargement, Structural Flexibility, Fiscal Policy
JEL Codes: F2, F15, F33, F42
ISBN No.: 3-902109-22-X
Authors: Andrew Hughes Hallett, Svend E. Hougaard Jensen and Christian Richter

Download Study

Study 2004/3Study 2004/3

© SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum 2010-2018 .:. Société Universitaire Européenne de Recherches Financières

Privacy Policy .:. Legal notice

Design by draganmarkovic.net