Global liquidity and monetary policy transmission

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Liquidity and Market Efficiency – Alive and Well?
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*Views expressed here are mine, not necessarily those of the BIS
Direct and intermediated finance

Ultimate Borrowers

Intermediate Credit

Banks

Claim

Ultimate Creditors

Directly granted credit
Year-on-year rate of growth in international bank claims


1 Includes all BIS reporting banks’ cross-border credit and local credit in foreign currency.

Sources: Bloomberg; BIS locational banking statistics by residence.
Direct and intermediated finance: two phases

- **Banking sector-led credit growth (2003–2008)**
  - Cross-border banking
  - Wholesale funding as marginal source of finance
- **Bond market-led credit growth (2010–)**
  - Search for yield by long-term investors as creditors
  - Focus on corporate borrowers, especially EME corporates

- US dollar as unit of account in debt contracts
  - Borrowers borrow in dollars, lenders lend in dollars, irrespective of whether the borrower or lender is located in the United States
Textbook framework for international finance
Unit of analysis is national income (balance of payments) area

Economic territory 1

Output 1

Economic territory 2

Output 2
Textbook framework for international finance
Floating exchange rates allow monetary policy autonomy

Economic territory 1

Central bank 1

Residents in 1

Economic territory 2

Central bank 2

Residents in 2

Exchange rate
The US dollar and the waxing and waning of cross-border banking
US dollar-denominated cross-border bank claims
In USD billions

Source: BIS locational banking statistics by residence.
US dollar-denominated cross-border bank claims
In USD billions

2003

Source: BIS locational banking statistics by residence.
US dollar-denominated cross-border bank claims

In USD billions

Source: BIS locational banking statistics by residence.
US dollar-denominated cross-border bank claims
In USD billions

Source: BIS locational banking statistics by residence.
US dollar-denominated cross-border bank claims
In USD billions

Source: BIS locational banking statistics by residence.
US dollar-denominated cross-border bank claims
In USD billions

Source: BIS locational banking statistics by residence.
US dollar- and euro-denominated cross-border bank claims
In USD billions

2007

Source: BIS locational banking statistics by residence.
US dollar cross-border bank lending: 2002–07

- Increase of $3.6 trillion between 2002 and 2007
  - Two thirds of increase ($2.3 trillion) due to US-Europe nexus
  - US-based banks account for only 35% of total increase in US dollar cross-border bank lending
- European banks intermediating US dollar funding
  - At end-2007, European banks had twice the dollar claims on Asian borrowers as US-based banks ($393 bn vs $190 bn)
US dollar-denominated cross-border bank claims
In USD billions

Source: BIS locational banking statistics by residence.
US dollar-denominated cross-border bank claims
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Source: BIS locational banking statistics by residence.
US dollar-denominated cross-border bank claims
In USD billions

2014

Source: BIS locational banking statistics by residence.
Currency denomination does not follow the national income boundary: the case of non-banks
Bank loans include cross-border and locally extended loans to non-banks outside the United States. For China and Hong Kong SAR, locally extended loans are derived from national data on total local lending in foreign currencies on the assumption that 80% are denominated in US dollars. For other non-BIS reporting countries, local US dollar loans to non-banks are proxied by all BIS reporting banks’ gross cross-border US dollar loans to banks in the country. Bonds issued by US national non-bank financial sector entities resident in the Cayman Islands have been excluded.

Bank loans include cross-border and locally extended loans to non-banks outside the euro area. For China and Hong Kong SAR, locally extended loans are derived from national data on total local lending in foreign currencies on the assumption that 20% are denominated in euros. For other non-BIS reporting countries, local euro loans to non-banks are proxied by all BIS reporting banks’ gross cross-border euro loans to banks in the country.

US dollar-denominated credit to borrowers outside US

Source: McCauley, McGuire and Sushko (BIS 2014); data as of Dec 2013.
Traditional balance of payments boundary may understate “external” dollar credit
US dollar credit to non-bank borrowers including offshore issuance

In billions of US dollars

Brazil

China

India

1 US dollar-denominated loans to non-bank residents of the country listed in the panel titles. For China, locally extended US dollar loans are estimated from national data on total foreign currency loans, assuming 80% are dollar-denominated. 2 Outstanding US dollar debt securities issued by non-financial residents of the country listed in the panel title. 3 Outstanding US dollar-denominated bonds issued offshore (i.e. outside the country listed in the panel title) by non-financials with the nationality listed in the panel title.

Sources: BIS locational banking statistics by residency; BIS International Debt Securities Statistics; national sources; authors’ calculations.
US dollar credit to non-banks outside the United States

Bank loans include cross-border and locally extended loans to non-banks outside the United States. For China and Hong Kong SAR, locally extended loans are derived from national data on total local lending in foreign currencies on the assumption that 80% are denominated in US dollars. For other non-BIS reporting countries, local US dollar loans to non-banks are proxied by all BIS reporting banks’ gross cross-border US dollar loans to banks in the country. Bonds issued by US national non-bank financial sector entities resident in the Cayman Islands have been excluded.

What assets back the 9.5 trillion US dollar debt of non-bank borrowers outside the United States?

● Many have dollar cash flows:
  ▪ Exporters
  ▪ Commodity producers

● Some do not:
  ▪ Property developers
  ▪ Utilities

● Even with dollar cash flows, a strong dollar may lead to strains:
  ▪ Commodity prices negatively correlated with the dollar
  ▪ Credit tightening through the “risk-taking channel”
Risk-taking channel and exchange rates
Risk-taking channel and exchange rates

- When the dollar is weak,
  - Some borrower balance sheets look strong
  - Perceived credit quality goes up
  - Spare lending capacity appears for any given exposure limit
  - Credit supply is more plentiful

- When the dollar is strong,
  - Some borrower balance sheets look weaker
  - Perceived credit quality deteriorates
  - Lending capacity falls for any given exposure limit
  - Credit supply tightens
Portfolio consists of USD bonds and local currency bonds.
Outcome distributions in the Vasicek model due to shifts in probability of default $\varepsilon$ (left-hand panel)
Credit and market risk exposure (in USD)

Portfolio consists of USD bonds and local currency bonds
USD appreciation increases credit risk on dollar-denominated bonds. Risk exposure breaches previous exposure limit.

Increase in total exposure due to local currency depreciation.
Bring total exposure back in line by reducing credit supply, including local currency lending

Risk-taking channel and exchange rates

- Even borrowers with no currency mismatch will see credit conditions fluctuate with the exchange rate.

- It is the bilateral US dollar exchange rate, not the traded-weighted effective exchange rate that matters.

- Reason is the outstanding stock of USD debt.
Evidence from EME bond mutual funds
Local currency and dollar returns for EME sovereign bond funds

- Local currency returns
- US dollar returns
### Table 17: Estimates of the duration of global EME local currency bond funds

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<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>33 funds with data on NAV and flows available and using JP Morgan GBI-EM Global Diversified index as benchmark</td>
<td>US dollar</td>
<td>9.58*** (56.74)</td>
<td>12.77*** (23.84)</td>
<td>11.12*** (62.15)</td>
<td>7.09*** (31.96)</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 funds with data on NAV, flows and asset allocation available and using JP Morgan GBI-EM Global Diversified index as benchmark</td>
<td>US dollar</td>
<td>9.93*** (21.58)</td>
<td>12.51*** (11.85)</td>
<td>11.51*** (24.41)</td>
<td>7.83*** (15.16)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local currency</td>
<td>5.21*** (32.60)</td>
<td>3.84*** (7.46)</td>
<td>5.43*** (30.86)</td>
<td>5.16*** (24.38)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local currency</td>
<td>5.47*** (12.50)</td>
<td>6.11*** (7.10)</td>
<td>5.54*** (12.58)</td>
<td>4.88*** (9.36)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP Morgan GBI-EM Global Diversified index</td>
<td>US dollar</td>
<td>9.31*** (7.38)</td>
<td>13.85*** (3.32)</td>
<td>10.63*** (10.85)</td>
<td>6.86*** (2.68)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local currency</td>
<td>4.85*** (60.71)</td>
<td>4.66*** (27.90)</td>
<td>4.87*** (45.24)</td>
<td>4.94*** (27.19)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

_t-statistics in brackets are calculated from standard errors clustered at the fund level._

_Sources: EPFR; authors’ calculations._

Source: Shek, Shim and Shin (BIS working paper forthcoming)
Evidence from EME sovereign CDS spreads
Illustrating the risk-taking channel
Bilateral USD exchange rate and five-year sovereign CDS

End-March 2013

BR = Brazil; ID = Indonesia; MX = Mexico; MY = Malaysia; RU = Russia; TR = Turkey; ZA = South Africa.

The size of the bubbles indicates the size of dollar debt in Q4 2014.

Sources: Markit; national data; BIS.
Illustrating the risk-taking channel
Bilateral USD exchange rate and five-year sovereign CDS

End-May 2013

BR = Brazil; ID = Indonesia; MX = Mexico; MY = Malaysia; RU = Russia; TR = Turkey; ZA = South Africa.
The size of the bubbles indicates the size of dollar debt in Q4 2014.

Sources: Markit; national data; BIS.
Illustrating the risk-taking channel
Bilateral USD exchange rate and five-year sovereign CDS

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The size of the bubbles indicates the size of dollar debt in Q4 2014.

Sources: Markit; national data; BIS.
Illustrating the risk-taking channel
Bilateral USD exchange rate and five-year sovereign CDS

End-September 2013

BR = Brazil; ID = Indonesia; MX = Mexico; MY = Malaysia; RU = Russia; TR = Turkey; ZA = South Africa.
The size of the bubbles indicates the size of dollar debt in Q4 2014.

Sources: Markit; national data; BIS.
Illustrating the risk-taking channel
Bilateral USD exchange rate and five-year sovereign CDS

End-December 2013

BR = Brazil; ID = Indonesia; MX = Mexico; MY = Malaysia; RU = Russia; TR = Turkey; ZA = South Africa.
The size of the bubbles indicates the size of dollar debt in Q4 2014.

Sources: Markit; national data; BIS.
Illustrating the risk-taking channel
Bilateral USD exchange rate and five-year sovereign CDS

End-March 2014

BR = Brazil; ID = Indonesia; MX = Mexico; MY = Malaysia; RU = Russia; TR = Turkey; ZA = South Africa.
The size of the bubbles indicates the size of dollar debt in Q4 2014.

Sources: Markit; national data; BIS.
Illustrating the risk-taking channel
Bilateral USD exchange rate and five-year sovereign CDS

End-June 2014

Change in USD exchange rate from end-
Change in CDS from end-

BR = Brazil; ID = Indonesia; MX = Mexico; MY = Malaysia; RU = Russia; TR = Turkey; ZA = South Africa.
The size of the bubbles indicates the size of dollar debt in Q4 2014.

Sources: Markit; national data; BIS.
Illustrating the risk-taking channel
Bilateral USD exchange rate and five-year sovereign CDS

BR = Brazil; ID = Indonesia; MX = Mexico; MY = Malaysia; RU = Russia; TR = Turkey; ZA = South Africa.
The size of the bubbles indicates the size of dollar debt in Q4 2014.

Sources: Markit; national data; BIS.
Illustrating the risk-taking channel
Bilateral USD exchange rate and five-year sovereign CDS

Mid-November 2014

BR = Brazil; ID = Indonesia; MX = Mexico; MY = Malaysia; RU = Russia; TR = Turkey; ZA = South Africa.
The size of the bubbles indicates the size of dollar debt in Q4 2014.

Sources: Markit; national data; BIS.
Illustrating the risk-taking channel
Bilateral USD exchange rate and five-year sovereign CDS

End-December 2014

Measurements:
- Change in USD exchange rate from end
- Change in CDS from end in basis points

BR = Brazil; ID = Indonesia; MX = Mexico; MY = Malaysia; RU = Russia; TR = Turkey; ZA = South Africa.

The size of the bubbles indicates the size of dollar debt in Q4 2014.

Sources: Markit; national data; BIS.
Illustrating the risk-taking channel
Bilateral USD exchange rate and five-year sovereign CDS

End-March 2015

BR = Brazil; ID = Indonesia; MX = Mexico; MY = Malaysia; RU = Russia; TR = Turkey; ZA = South Africa.
The size of the bubbles indicates the size of dollar debt in Q4 2014.

Sources: Markit; national data; BIS.
Illustrating the risk-taking channel
Bilateral USD exchange rate and five-year sovereign CDS

End-May 2015

BR = Brazil; ID = Indonesia; MX = Mexico; MY = Malaysia; RU = Russia; TR = Turkey; ZA = South Africa.
The size of the bubbles indicates the size of dollar debt in Q4 2014.

Sources: Markit; national data; BIS.
Illustrating the risk-taking channel
Bilateral USD exchange rate and five-year sovereign CDS

**Mid-June 2015**

BR = Brazil; ID = Indonesia; MX = Mexico; MY = Malaysia; RU = Russia; TR = Turkey; ZA = South Africa.
The size of the bubbles indicates the size of dollar debt in Q4 2014.

Sources: Markit; national data; BIS.
Macro implications
“Leverage-like” behaviour without leverage

- Our understanding of crisis propagation is heavily influenced by experience of 2008 crisis
  - 2008 crisis was made more potent by leverage
  - However, it does not follow that future bouts of market disruptions must follow the same mechanism as the past
- Long-term investors may have limited appetite for losses
  - Risk mitigation or hedging techniques elicit behaviour similar to leveraged players
  - Asset gathering ability rests on relative performance
- All these mechanisms are sharper when prices are more sensitive to shifts risk-taking
Redemptions and discretionary sales
Sales from redemption pressures and additional discretionary sales
Breakdown of monthly changes in net asset values

Sum over 14 global EM local currency bond funds, in billions of US dollars

Sources: EPFR; authors’ calculations.

Source: Shek, Shim and Shin (BIS working paper, forthcoming)
Breakdown of monthly changes in net asset values

Sum over 16 global EM hard currency bond funds, in billions of US dollars

Sources: EPFR; authors’ calculations.

Source: Shek, Shim and Shin (BIS working paper, forthcoming)
Measuring investor clustering in global EME bond funds

January 2013 to February 2015, weekly data

**Retail investor (174 GEM, 1488 global bond funds)**

Share of the number of funds facing net inflows out of that facing net inflows or outflows

**Institutional investor (194 GEM, 1400 global bond funds)**

Share of the number of funds facing net inflows out of that facing net inflows or outflows

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Figures in brackets represent the number of funds in each category.

1 In the EPFR database, institutional investor funds are defined as funds targeting institutional investors only or those with the minimum amount of $100,000 per account.

2 Assume that the average size of retail investors is $1 million.

3 Assume that the average size of institutional investors is $10 million.

Sources: EPFR; authors' calculations.

Source: Shek, Shim and Shin (BIS working paper, forthcoming)
Global EME bond funds facing sizable redemptions  
January 2013 to February 2015, weekly data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Retail investor funds (174)¹</th>
<th>Institutional investor funds (194)¹</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Outflows as a percentage of NAV²</strong></td>
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<td><img src="image" alt="Graph 5" /></td>
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<th>Share of outflow greater than one percent³</th>
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¹ Figures in brackets represent the number of funds in each category. ² The total amount of outflows in each week divided by the total NAV of those funds facing outflows in that week. ³ The number of funds facing outflows greater than 1 per cent of their own NAV divided by the total number of funds in each category (174 retail funds and 194 institutional funds, respectively).

Sources: EPFR; authors’ calculations.

Source: Shek, Shim and Shin (BIS working paper, forthcoming)
Yields of local EM government bonds and the EM exchange rates

Five-year govt bond yields

Volatility of yields

The exchange rate

The black vertical line corresponds to 1 May 2013 (FOMC statement changing the wording on asset purchases).

Countries included: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Poland, South Africa and Turkey.

Elements in possible distress loop

1. Steepening of local currency yield curve
2. Currency depreciation, corporate distress, freeze in corporate CAPEX, slowdown in growth
3. Runs of wholesale corporate deposits from domestic banking sector
4. Asset managers cut back positions in EME corporate bonds citing slower growth in EMEs
5. Back to Step 1, and repeat ...

http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/events/2013/november/asia-economic-policy-conference/
Monetary policy spillovers and "spillbacks"
Monetary policy spillovers and “spillbacks”

McCaulley, McGuire and Sushko (2014):
US yield curve flattening associated with US dollar offshore bond issuance after 2009
Monetary policy spillovers and “spillbacks”

- Three questions:
  1. How much is the recent weak macro reading in the United States due to the strong dollar?
  2. To what extent is the strong dollar due to “net short” position in dollars outside the United States?
  3. How should monetary policy take account of spillbacks – and hence initial spillovers?